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We use admissions lotteries to estimate effects of attendance at Bos-
ton’s charter high schools on college preparation and enrollment.
Charter schools increase pass rates on Massachusetts’ high-stakes
exit exam,with largeeffectsonthe likelihoodofqualifyingfora state-
sponsored scholarship. Charter attendance also boosts SAT scores
sharply and increases the likelihoodof taking anAdvancedPlacement
ðAPÞ exam, the number of AP exams taken, and AP scores. Char-
ters induce a substantial shift from 2- to 4-year institutions, though
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the effect on overall college enrollment is modest. Charter effects on
college-related outcomes are strongly correlatedwith charter effects
on earlier tests.
I. Introduction
A growing body of evidence indicates that many urban charter schools
have large, positive effects on the test scores of disadvantaged students.
Oversubscribed charter schools in Boston increase the test scores of low-
income students by a third of a standard deviation a year—enough to elim-
inate the black-white test score gap in a few years of attendance ðAbdul-
kadirog˘lu et al. 2011Þ. Similar effects have been found in New York City
ðDobbie and Fryer 2011Þ and in a nationwide study of oversubscribed ur-
ban charter schools ðClark et al. 2011Þ.
Although encouraging, gains on state-mandated standardized tests pro-
vide an inconclusive gauge of the benefits of charter attendance. Like other
American public schools, charters are evaluated in part by the performance
of their students on these tests. A growing literature suggests that educa-
tors respond strategically to the incentive to boost test scores ðNeal and
Schanzenbach 2010Þ. In some cases, teachers have been found to cheat in
order to avoid sanctions or to garner the rewards associated with high
scores on tests used for accountability ðJacob and Levitt 2003Þ.
The potentially distortionary effect of test-based accountability may be
especially large in the charter sector, where schools whose students do
poorly on state assessments can be closed. In our Massachusetts setting,
for example, 14 out of 96 charters granted through 2013 have been lost.
Charter schools would appear to have a particularly strong incentive to
teach to the test, at the expense, perhaps, of a focus on the development of
skills with a longer-term payoff.
This paper assesses the consequences of Boston charter high school at-
tendance for outcomes beyond the test scores used for accountability pur-
poses. We look here at outcomes where the link with human capital and
Fund. Grateful thanks go to Boston’s charter schools, to Kamal Chavda and the
Boston Public Schools, and to Carrie Conaway, Cliff Chuang, and the staff of the
Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education for data and
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Columbia,LondonSchool ofEconomics,NationalUniversity of Singapore,NBER
Summer Institute, Oberlin College, the Society of Labor Economists, Toulouse
School of Economics, Singapore Management University, and Uppsala University
provided helpful comments. Pathak thanks the National Science Foundation for
research support. Annice Correia provided excellent research and administrative
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future earnings seems likely to be sustained and strong, focusing on vari-
ables that are essential to or facilitate postsecondary schooling. These out-
comes include high school graduation, the attainment of state competency
thresholds, scholarship qualification, Advanced Placement ðAPÞ and SAT
performance, college enrollment, type of institution, and college persis-
tence. Few of these measures are targeted for accountability purposes.
Postsecondary schooling is also strongly linked with earnings, althoughwe
cannot, as yet, look at earnings directly.
Our analysis covers Boston’s charter high schools for cohorts who
applied when there were more applicants than seats. Oversubscribed
Massachusetts charters allocate seats by lottery, thereby generating our
research design. For our purposes, an analysis of high schools is both a
necessity and a virtue. It is necessary to study high schools because most
students applying to charters in earlier grades are not yet old enough to
generate data on postsecondary outcomes. Charter high schools are also
of substantial policy interest: a growing literature suggests that high school
may be too late for cost-effective human capital interventions ðsee, e.g.,
Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach 2010Þ. Consistent with this view, im-
pact analyses of interventions for urban youth have mostly generated dis-
appointing results.1 We assess whether charter high schools produce mean-
ingful long-term gains for disadvantaged urban youth.
Our findings suggest that the gains from Boston’s high-performing
charter high schools extend well beyond high-stakes tests. Charter atten-
dance doubles the likelihood that a student sits for an Advanced Placement
ðAPÞ exam, with especially large gains in the share of students taking sci-
ence exams. Attending a charter school quadruples the likelihood of taking
an AP Calculus exam and increases the fraction of students earning an AP
Calculus score high enough to qualify for college credit from 2%, for non-
charter attendees, to 13%, for charter attendees. Charters also boost SAT
scores sharply, especially inmath. Importantly, our estimated SATgains are
about as large as the estimated gains on the state’s high-stakes high school
exit exam, in spite of the fact that SAT scores are unrelated to state-mandated
accountability standards. Although overall college enrollment effects are
not statistically significant, charter attendance induces a clear shift from
2-year to 4-year colleges, with gains most pronounced at 4-year public in-
stitutions inMassachusetts.
Our analysis also links gains on accountability assessments to gains in
later outcomes, finding that effects on the two sets of outcomes are highly
1 For example, Dynarski et al. ð1998Þ and Dynarski and Gleason ð2002Þ docu-
ment an array of discouraging findings for interventions meant to reduce dropout
rates. See also Dynarski and Wood ð1997Þ and Kemple and Snipes ð2000Þ for re-
sults on alternative schools and career academies, where the findings are mixed at
best.
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positively correlated. In other words, whether or not state assessments are
of intrinsic interest, gains on state tests predict gains elsewhere. Finally,
because Boston’s charter applicants are positively selected relative to the
traditional Boston Public School ðBPSÞ population, we explore the possi-
bility that peer composition mediates charter effects. The results of this
exploration are inconsistent with the notion that changes in peer compo-
sition account for our main findings.
The next section provides background onMassachusetts charter schools
and describes the data used here. Section III outlines our empirical strat-
egy and reports first-stage estimates and benchmark effects on standard-
ized test scores. Section IV reviews findings for college preparation, while
Section V discusses effects on college enrollment, choice, and persistence.
Section VI reports effects in subgroups and discusses our evidence on peer
effects. Section VII concludes.
II. Background and Data
A. Boston’s Charter Sector
Boston’s oversubscribed charter schools generate impressive test score
gains. Lottery estimates show that each year spent at a charter middle
school boosts scores by about a fifth of a standard deviation in English
language arts ðELAÞ and over a third of a standard deviation in math. High
school gains are just as large ðAbdulkadirog˘lu et al. 2011Þ. These effects
are in line with those generated by urban charters elsewhere in Massachu-
setts, as we have shown in studies of a Knowledge Is Power Program
ðKIPPÞ school in Lynn, Massachusetts ðAngrist et al. 2010, 2012Þ and in
an analysis of charter lottery results from around the state ðAngrist et al.
2011; Angrist, Pathak, and Walters 2013Þ.
A defining feature of Massachusetts’ successful urban charter schools
appears to be adherence toNoExcusespedagogy, an approach to urban edu-
cation described in a book of the same name ðThernstrom and Thernstrom
2003Þ. No Excuses schools emphasize discipline and comportment, tradi-
tional reading and math skills, extended instruction time, and selective
teacher hiring. Massachusetts’No Excuses charters also make heavy use of
Teach forAmerica ðTFAÞ corpsmembers and alumni andprovide extensive
and ongoing feedback to teachers. Like most Boston charter schools, the
high schools studied here largely identify with theNo Excuses approach, a
fact documented in table 1.2
Charter schools are a recent innovation; Massachusetts’ first charter
schools opened in 1995. Not surprisingly, therefore, most evidence on
2 Other lottery-based evidence on No Excuses’s effectiveness includes the
Dobbie and Fryer ð2011Þ study of a charter school in the Harlem Children’s Zone,
the Dobbie and Fryer ð2013Þ study of a larger sample of New York charters, and
results for a sample of KIPP schools from around the country ðTuttle et al. 2013Þ.
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charter effectiveness comes from outcomes measured while children are
still enrolled in elementary and secondary school. An exception is Dobbie
and Fryer’s recent ð2015Þ lottery-based study, which follows applicants to a
charter middle school in the HarlemChildren’s Zone, estimating effects on
college enrollment while also looking at noneducational outcomes related to
crime and teen pregnancy. Dobbie and Fryer find that Promise Academy
boosts college enrollment while reducing pregnancy for girls and incarcer-
ation for boys. Earlier work by Booker et al. ð2008Þ uses statistical controls
and distance instruments to identify the effects of charter school attendance
onhigh schoolgraduationandcollegeenrollment.Results frombothof these
empirical strategies suggest gains for charter students. We complement this
earlier workwith new results on postsecondary preparation, enrollment, and
college choice for a large sample of charter high school lottery applicants.
B. Data and Sample
1. School Selection
We set out to study the effects of attendance at six charter high schools
in Boston. These schools generated the lottery-based estimates of charter
high school achievement effects reported in our earlier study ðAbdulka-
dirog˘lu et al. 2011Þ, and they account for the bulk of charter high school
enrollment in Boston today.3 Two additional charter high schools serving
Boston students in the same period are now closed. One school that is still
open has poor records and appears unsuitable for a lottery-based analysis.
Table 1 describes features of the charter schools included in this study,
as well as those of the full set of charter high schools in Boston and Bos-
ton’s traditional public schools, including exam schools. This table clas-
sifies charters according to whether they cover grades 9–12 or are limited
to grades 9–12. Boston’s charters run a longer school day and year than
traditional public schools, and they make frequent use of Saturday school.
As a result, charter school students receive about 1,500 hours per year of
instruction, compared to 1,150 in the traditional public schools. Most of
Boston’s charters adhere to the No Excuses instructional approach. As
shown in panel B of table 1, charter teachers are younger than their tra-
ditional public school counterparts: 69% of teachers in our analysis sam-
ple are age 32 or younger, compared to 23% of traditional public school
teachers. Similarly, only 4% of ðstudy sampleÞ charter teachers are age 49
or older, while 30% of public school teachers are at least age 49. Charter
3 The six schools are Academy of the Pacific RimCharter Public School, Boston
Collegiate Charter School, Boston Preparatory Charter Public School, City on a
Hill Charter Public School, Codman Academy Charter Public School, and Match
High School.
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class sizes are smaller than those at traditional public schools. Per pupil
expenditures are broadly similar across sectors, with traditional public
high schools spending about $1,000 more per student. All public schools
in Boston, including charters, qualify for Title I aid.
2. Student Data
Massachusetts charter schools admit students by lottery when they have
more applicants than seats. We collected lists of charter school applicants
and information on the results of admissions lotteries from individual char-
ter schools. These lists were then matched to administrative records cov-
ering all Massachusetts public school students. Our analysis sample is lim-
ited to charter applicants who applied for a charter school seat from fall
2002 through fall 2009. Additional information on applicant lotteries ap-
pears in the data appendix ðapp. AÞ and table A1.
We matched applicant records to administrative data using applicants’
names, cohorts, and grades of application. Where available, information
on date of birth, town of residence, race or ethnicity, and gender was used
to break ties. Among applicants eligible for our study, 94% were matched
to state data.4 Applicants were excluded from the analysis if they were dis-
qualified from the lottery ðthese are mostly applicants to the wrong gradeÞ.
We also omit siblings of current charter students, late applicants, and some
out-of-area applicants. Students submitting charter applications in multi-
ple years appear only once in the sample, with data recorded for the first
application only. Information on baseline demographics and test scores
comes from the most recent pre-lottery data available in the state database.
In addition to providing demographic information and scores on state as-
sessments, state administrative records include AP and SAT scores for all
public school students tested in Massachusetts.
Information on college enrollment and choice comes from the National
Student Clearinghouse ðNSCÞ. TheMassachusetts Department of Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education routinely requests an NSC match for Mas-
sachusetts high school graduates; as described in the data appendix, we
combined the graduate files with supplemental information on nongrad-
uates. NSC data record enrollment spells at participating postsecondary
4 Match rates differ little by win/loss status, a fact documented in app. table A2.
Online app. table B3 shows that results for applicant cohorts where match rate dif-
ferentials are largest ðmostly recent cohorts with projected graduation dates after
2009Þ are typically similar to those for the full sample, though effects on reading
scores are somewhat smaller for the balanced cohorts. Appendix B, table B4, re-
ports Lee ð2009Þ bounds accounting for differential attrition. The bounds imply
substantial and significant test score impacts in both subjects.
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institutions, which account for 94%ofMassachusetts undergraduates.Mis-
sing schools mostly run small vocational and technical programs.
Different outcomes generate different follow-up horizons, depending
onwhen in a student’s schooling career they are collected.We define follow-
up horizons based on each applicant cohort’s projected senior year of high
school.5 The earliest information available on baseline ðpre-applicationÞ
characteristics is from the school year ending in spring 2002. The earliest
outcome data are therefore contributed by students projected to graduate
in spring 2006.Outcome-specific samples range over projected senior years
as follows:
• MCAS scores: These results are for students with projected senior
years ending in spring 2006 to spring 2013; the outcomehere is a tenth-
grade score on the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment Sys-
tem ðMCASÞ assessment. Some students retake tenth-grade MCAS
tests in a later grade, an outcome we also see. MCAS scores are stan-
dardized to the state score distribution by grade, year, and subject.
MCAS results include an analysis of effects on state-determined com-
petency standards and scholarship awards.
• AP and SAT scores: These results are for applicants with projected
senior years 2007–13, including tests taken earlier than the senior
year. AP and SAT scores are in their original units ðAP scores run
from 1 to 5; SAT subject scores run from 200 to 800Þ.
• High school graduation:High school graduation data are for cohorts
projected to finish between 2006 and 2013.
• College outcomes: These are for students with projected senior years
2006–12 ðthe most recent cohort for which we have NSC data is the
high school class of 2012Þ.
Table 2 compares charter applicants with the full sample of traditional
BPS ninth-graders in each outcome sample. Applicants tend to have higher
baseline test scores than the traditional BPS population and are more likely
to be black. Limited English proficient students are underrepresented among
charter applicants, but the proportion of applicants identified as qualifying
for special education services is almost as high among charter applicants as
in the traditional BPS population.
5 The projected senior year equals the eighth-grade year plus 4 for applicants to
City on a Hill, Codman Academy, and Match High ðschools where applicants
apply for ninth-grade entryÞ, the fourth-grade year plus 8 for applicants to Boston
Collegiate ðwhere applicants apply for fifth-grade entryÞ, and the fifth-grade year
plus 7 for applicants toAcademyof thePacificRimandBostonPreparatory ðschools
where applicants apply for sixth-grade entryÞ.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
All BPS
Ninth-Graders
Charter
Lottery Applicants
Mean Mean
Immediate
Offer Gap
Waitlist
Offer Gap
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
A. Projected senior year 2006–13
ðMCAS outcome sampleÞ:
Female .496 .540 .025 2.014
ð.019Þ ð.011Þ
Black .421 .613 2.004 2.001
ð.018Þ ð.010Þ
Hispanic .308 .250 .006 2.002
ð.016Þ ð.009Þ
Asian .101 .033 2.003 .002
ð.006Þ ð.003Þ
Subsidized lunch .743 .729 .020 2.006
ð.017Þ ð.010Þ
Special education .204 .182 .012 2.009
ð.015Þ ð.008Þ
Limited English proficiency .120 .035 2.001 .002
ð.007Þ ð.004Þ
Baseline MCAS ELA 2.489 2.298 2.046 .026
ð.035Þ ð.019Þ
Baseline MCAS Math 2.427 2.312 2.027 .018
ð.035Þ ð.020Þ
p-value .805 .748
Charter attendance .297
Immediate offer .308
Waitlist offer .347
N 29,846 3,685
B. Other outcome samples:
Projected senior year 2007–13:
Took any AP .268 .286
Took SAT .496 .642
N 22,467 3,672
Projected senior year 2006–12:
On-time college enrollment .368 .488
N 26,584 3,205
NOTE.—This table shows descriptive statistics for Boston Public School ðBPSÞ students and charter lot-
tery applicants as well as differences by lottery offer status. Column 1 shows means for BPS ninth-graders
projected to graduate between 2006 and 2013, assuming normal academic progress from eighth grade. Col-
umn2 showsmeans for charter applicants in the sameprojected graduationyear range.Columns 3 and4 report
coefficients from regressions of characteristics on immediate andwaitlist lottery offers, controlling for risk set
indicators. The sample for these regressions is restricted to charter lottery applicantswith tenth-gradeMCAS
ELA ðMassachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System English language artsÞ scores. The p-values are
from tests of the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero. Baseline grade is defined as fourth grade for Boston
Collegiate applicants, fifth grade for Boston Preparatory and Academy of the Pacific Rim applicants, and
eighth grade for Match High, Codman Academy, and City on a Hill applicants. The baseline grade for BPS
ninth-graders is eighth grade. PanelB showsoutcomemeans for theAP/SATandNSCanalysis samples.On-
time college enrollment indicates enrollment by the semester after projected high school graduation. Stan-
dard errors are shown in parentheses.
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III. Empirical Framework
A. Models and Instruments
We estimate the effects of charter school attendance on high school grad-
uation rates, measures of AP and SAT test-taking and scores, college en-
rollment and type, and college persistence. As a benchmark, we also report
results for tenth-grade MCAS scores, including effects on competency
thresholds in Massachusetts and eligibility for the state’s Adams Scholar-
ship, which grants public university tuition waivers to public high school
students based on a combination ofMCASmath and ELA cutoffs.
Our lottery-based empirical strategy is motivated by the observation
that charter attendance is a choice that may be correlated with motivation,
ability, or family background. Conventional regression estimates of the ef-
fects of charter attendance may therefore fail to capture causal effects. To
eliminate selection bias, our empirical strategy uses randomly assigned
charter lotteryoffers toestimate theeffectsof attendingcharter schools.The
second-stage equation for our lottery-based two-stage least squares ð2SLSÞ
analysis links charter school attendance with outcomes as follows:
yi 5 o
j
djdij 1 g
0Xi 1 rCi 1 εi; ð1Þ
where yi is the outcome of interest for student i, Xi is a vector including
tenth-grade-year dummies and a set of pre-lottery demographic character-
istics ðgender, race, special education, limited English proficiency, subsi-
dized lunch status, and a female-minority interactionÞ, and εi is an error
term. The dij are dummy variables for all combinations of charter school
lotteries ðindexed by jÞ to which lottery sample applicants applied. In what
follows, we refer to these combinations as “risk sets.” These are included
because the applicationmix determines the probability of receiving an offer
even when offers at each school are randomly assigned.6 The variable of in-
terest,Ci, indicates attendance at any of the six charter schools in our lottery
sample in ninth or tenth grade. The parameter r captures the causal effect
of charter school attendance.
We use charter offer dummies as instruments. The immediate offer in-
strument, Zi1, indicates offers made on the day of the charter school lot-
tery. Because some applicants who do not receive offers on lottery day do
so at a later date when their names are reached on a randomly orderedwait-
list, we also use a second instrument, called waitlist offer, or Zi2. Some risk
sets have only one instrument, in which case the other is set to zero and
absorbed by controls for risk sets.Appendix tableA1details the schools and
application cohorts for which we observe immediate and waitlist offers.
6 For example, in a world with three charter schools and one entry cohort, there
are seven risk sets: all schools, each school, and any two.
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The first stage for our 2SLS procedure is
Ci 5 o
j
mjdij 1 b
0Xi 1 p1Zi1 1 p2Zi2 1 hi; ð2Þ
where two separate parameters, p1 and p2, capture the effects of immediate
and waitlist offers on charter attendance. As in the second-stage equation,
the first stage includes risk set controls, tenth-grade-year dummies, and
baseline demographic characteristics. With two instruments used to esti-
mate a single causal effect, we can interpret 2SLS estimates as a statistically
efficient weighted average of what we would get from an estimation strat-
egy that uses the instruments one at a time. Standard errors are clustered at
the tenth-grade-school-by-year level.
Randomly assigned lottery offers are independent of student ability or
family background. Consistent with presumed random assignment, col-
umns 3 and 4 of table 2 show that pre-lottery demographic variables and test
scores are similar for offered and nonoffered students. Specifically, differ-
ences in baseline characteristics by offer status are small and statistically
insignificant for all variables tested, and p-values from joint tests are high.
Although random assignment ensures apples-to-apples comparisons
among all those who apply, this statistical comparability is threatened by
differential attrition between offered and nonoffered students. Appendix
table A3 documents an MCAS follow-up rate close to 80%. Moreover,
panel B, which reports the effect of lottery offers on the likelihood students
contribute an MCAS score to our analysis sample, shows no significant
effects of lottery offers on follow-up. Follow-up rates for further down-
stream outcomes are largely determined by whether a student is seen in a
Massachusetts school in twelfth grade. Here too the estimates in panel B
are encouraging, with no systematic difference between offered and non-
offered students.
B. First-Stage Estimates and an MCAS Benchmark
A waitlist admissions offer in a charter lottery boosts the probability of
charter enrollment by 24 percentage points. This can be seen in column 3
of table 3,which reportswaitlist offer first-stage estimates.Column2 shows
that an immediate offer boosts charter enrollment by an additional 13 points.
The first-stage effect of an offer immediately following lottery day is there-
fore 37 percentage points.7
The relationship between lottery offers and charter enrollment—the size
of the first stage—is determined by the likelihood that an applicant chooses
to accept an offer. Our first-stage estimates are far from one because many
lottery winners choose not to enroll in charter schools. This is driven in
7 First-stage estimates differ slightly across outcomes due to small changes in
sample composition.
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part by the variety of options available to Boston high school students:
online appendix table C1 shows that some accepted applicants opt for a
traditional public school, one of Boston’s pilot schools, or an exam school.
In addition, some students who receive no offer in the lotteries for which
we have data receive one at a later date, further reducing the first stage. The
2SLS estimates adjust for differences between offers and enrollment, with
the resulting estimates capturing causal effects for those who comply with
ði.e., enroll in a charter school in response toÞ the offers recorded in our data
ðImbens and Angrist 1994Þ.
As a starting point, table 3 also reports first-stage, reduced form, and
2SLS estimates similar to those reported in our earlier Boston study for
tenth-grade MCAS scores ðAbdulkadirog˘lu et al. 2011Þ. Column 7, which
shows second-stage estimates of the parameter r from equation ð1Þ, in-
dicates that attendance at the charter high schools in our sample boosts
tenth-gradeELA scores by 0.4j, that is, four-tenths of a standard deviation,
while raising math scores by almost 0.6j.8
The analysis of longer-term outcomes necessarily covers fewer appli-
cant cohorts than are available for an analysis of MCAS scores. As a check
on the representativeness of the subsamples used to produce the estimates
of effects on later outcomes, we constructed 2SLS estimates of MCAS ef-
fects for the subsample of applicants contributing to our college-going anal-
ysis below. Estimates of effects on tenth-gradeMCAS scores in the college-
going sample, reported in panel B of table 3, are similar to estimates for
the full MCAS sample.
IV. College Preparation
A. MCAS Thresholds
Charter school attendance has large effects on the likelihood applicants
score in the upper-two MCAS score categories. This can be seen in col-
umn 2 of table 4, which documents large and statistically significant in-
creases in the likelihood charter applicants earn scores at a level deemed
“Proficient” or “Advanced.”
Since 2003, high school graduation inMassachusetts has been determined
in part by tenth-gradeMCAS scores. The initial state competency standard
required students to pass the Needs Improvement threshold with scaled
8 The estimates reported in our earlier study, Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. ð2011Þ, are
smaller than this because the former are scaled to measure the effect of years of
charter attendance, while those reported here show a charter enrollment effect,
without adjusting for years attended.We opted for a dummy-endogenous-variable
approach because this produces consistent specifications across outcomes, while
sidestepping issues related to timing and reverse causality. High school graduation,
e.g., causes years of charter enrollment as well as vice versa.
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scores of 220 in both math and ELA; for the graduating class of 2010 and
onward, standardswere increased to require Proficient scores of at least 240
in math, ELA, and science.9 Consistent with the score gains documented in
table 3, charter attendance boosts the likelihood of meeting competency
standards, with a gain of 15 points. This estimate also appears in column 2
of table 4.
Beginningwith the high school class of 2005, the state has used theMCAS
to determine qualification for public university tuition waivers, an award
known as the Adams Scholarship. Qualification for an Adams Scholar-
ship requires an MCAS score in the Advanced category in either ELA or
math, a score that is at least Proficient in the subject where the Advanced
standard is not met, and a total MCAS score in the upper quartile of the
distribution of scores in a scholarship candidate’s home school district.10
Awardees qualify for a tuition waiver at a Massachusetts public college or
university.11 As can be seen at the bottom of column 2 of table 4, charter
attendance increases the likelihood of qualifying for an Adams Scholar-
ship by 24 percentage points. This finding is notable in view of concerns
regarding racial imbalance in eligibility for some scholarship programs
ðDynarski 2000Þ. Attendance at Boston charter schools increases scholar-
ship eligibility for a mostly poor minority population.
The nature of the charter-induced shift in the distribution of MCAS
scores emerges clearly in figure 1. This figure plots estimated score distri-
butions for lottery compliers, that is, for applicants who take a charter seat
when offered one in a lottery but enroll in a traditional public school oth-
erwise.We plot densities for compliers because, as with our 2SLS estimates,
such comparisons are purged of the selection bias that contaminates an
unadjusted contrast between those who do and do not enroll in a charter
school. Comparisons for compliers therefore have a causal interpretation.
Complier distributions are estimated here by adapting methods intro-
duced by Abadie ð2002, 2003Þ. Specifically, for a grid of values, v, in the
support of an outcome variable, yi, we estimate equations of the following
form:
Khðv2 yiÞð12CiÞ5 ojk0jðvÞdij 1 g0ðvÞð12CiÞ1 u0iv; ð3Þ
Khðv2 yiÞCi 5 ojk1jðvÞdij 1 g1ðvÞCi 1 u1iv; ð4Þ
9 See http://www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/graduation.html for details. Updated rules
include an exception for students who pass the Needs Improvement threshold only
and also meet personal goals. We ignore this exception here.
10 Charter school students can earn a scholarship in either the district of atten-
dance ðthe charter schoolÞ or the district of residence ðBostonÞ. The Adams Schol-
arship cutoff is defined here using BPS thresholds.
11 Cohodes andGoodman ð2014Þ estimate effects of Adams Scholarships on col-
lege enrollment and choice, showing these appear to increase enrollment in public
universities in spite of the fact that they cover only a small portion of college costs.
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FIG. 1.—Complier distributions for MCAS scaled scores in ELA and math. This
figure plots smoothed MCAS scaled score distributions for treated and untreated
charter lottery compliers. The sample is restricted to lottery applicants projected
to graduate between 2006 and 2013. Dotted vertical lines indicate MCAS perfor-
mance category thresholds ð220 for Needs Improvement, 240 for Proficient, and
260 for AdvancedÞ. Densities are estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel with band-
width equal to twice the Silverman ð1986Þ rule-of-thumb. Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistics and p-values are from bootstrap tests of distributional equality for treated
and untreated compliers.
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where charter attendance Ci is treated as an endogenous regressor and in-
strumentedwith lottery offers.HereKhðvÞ5 ð1=2ÞKðv=hÞ is a kernel func-
tion with bandwidth h. The resulting estimates of g1ðvÞ and g0ðvÞ describe
densities for treated ðcharterÞ and untreated ðnoncharterÞ compliers.12
The x-axis in figure 1 marks MCAS score category cutoffs; these occur
at 20-point intervals. Charter school attendance clearly pushes the first-
attempt score distribution into the upper-three score groups. The effect of
charter attendance on ELA scores is striking: very few noncharter stu-
dents achieve at an Advanced level, while many charter students are in the
Advanced group. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of distributional equality sug-
gest that the distributional shifts documented in this figure are very unlikely
to be a chance finding.
B. Grade Progression and High School Graduation
Does charter attendance also increase high school graduation rates? Per-
haps surprisingly given the gains in test score graduation requirements re-
ported in column 2 of table 4, the estimates in column 4 of this table suggest
not. In fact, charter attendance reduces the likelihood a student graduates on
time by 14.5 percentage points, a statistically significant effect.13 This neg-
ative estimate falls to zero when the outcome is graduation within 5 years
of ninth-grade entry. Interestingly, charter schools appear nomore likely to
cause students to repeat ninth, tenth, or eleventh grade than are traditional
public schools. This is apparent from an analysis of effects on the likelihood
of starting twelfth grade on time. Instead, it appears that many charter
students take an additional twelfth-grade year to graduate, perhaps due to
their more rigorous graduation requirements. The subset of students taking
an additional year in high school may be substituting the high school year
for remediation in community college.14
C. SAT-Taking and Scores
The SAT is a major milestone for college-bound high school students,
and for many it is a major hurdle on the path to college. Designed to be
challenging for all takers, SAT scores are a special concern for low-income
and minority applicants. Gaps in SAT scores by race and socioeconomic
12 The grid for v covers each percentile of the observed MCAS distribution; the
kernel is Epanechnikov, with bandwidth twice the Silverman ð1986Þ rule-of-thumb.
Walters ð2013Þ shows that this method produces consistent estimates of density
functions for compliers.
13 On-time graduation dates are determined by counting from the entry grade to
grade 12.
14 High school is less expensive for the student, but Massachusetts community
college per pupil expenditures are around $10,000 per student, compared to about
$14,000 in high school.
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status that might be attributable to family background and school quality
are further accentuated by the willingness of higher-income families to in-
vest in SAT preparation classes ðsee, e.g., Bowen and Bok 2000Þ.
Many high schoolers in Boston’s traditional public schools take the SAT,
and charter attendance does little to change this rate. As can be seen in the
first two columns of table 5, nearly two-thirds of noncharter students in
our applicant sample take the SAT, while the estimated effect of charter
attendance on SAT-taking is about 8 points, a gap far from statistical
significance.15
SAT scores are much lower in Boston than in the rest of the state, with
fewer than 10% of noncharter students in our applicant sample scoring
above the state median on the composite test ðthe sum of math, verbal, and
writing scoresÞ. About three-quarters of noncharter students score in the
lowest quartile of the state distribution or do not take the SAT. Charter
attendance increases the share of students scoring above the bottom quar-
tile by 15 percentage points ðfrom 27% to 42%, as can be seen in col. 6Þ.16
Gains in math contribute most to this boost in composite scores; effects
on verbal and writing scores are smaller, though still statistically signifi-
cant. Charter attendance increases the probability that applicants earn an
SAT reasoning score ðthe sum of math and verbalÞ above the state median,
with math again the largest contributor to this gain.
Table 5 also reports SAT score effects estimated in samples limited to
those who take the test. Because charter attendance has little effect on the
decision to take the SAT, such conditional comparisons are unlikely to be
biased by compositional shifts. These conditional results show that Bos-
ton’s charters have large and statistically significant effects on SAT scores,
especially in math. Specifically, charter attendance boosts average math
scores by 52 points, a gain that amounts to over four-tenths of a standard
deviation in the US score distribution.17 This is almost as large ðin standard
deviation unitsÞ as the MCAS math effect reported in table 3, suggesting
that the gains in math skills demonstrated on the MCAS carry over to the
SAT. The score gain in verbal and writing is about 26 points in each sub-
ject. Although charter attendance has smaller effects on verbal and writing
scores, the composite SAT score gain is estimated to be about 104 points,
15 Charter applicants are positively selected, as shown by their somewhat higher
baseline test scores than the general BPS population. Similarly, the SAT-taking
rate among applicants of 0.63 exceeds the SAT-taking rate of 0.49 in the noncharter
BPS population.
16 In this calculation, we assign an SAT score of zero to those who do not take
the test.
17 Means ðand standard deviationsÞ of the US SAT distribution in 2012 were 512
ð117Þ in math, 496 ð114Þ in verbal, 488 ð114Þ in writing, 1010 ð214Þ for reasoning,
and 1498 ð316Þ for the composite.
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a large and statistically significant result. The gain here amounts to almost
one-third of a standard deviation in the US composite score distribution.
The corresponding effect on SAT reasoning is 78 points, also a large gain.
The effect of charter attendance on the SAT score distribution is sum-
marized in figure 2, which plots the distribution of SAT scores for treated
and untreated lottery compliers ðestimated as in fig. 1Þ. Charter school at-
tendance causes a pronounced rightward distributional shift in all three
SAT subjects, as well as for the composite score. Formal statistical tests of
distributional equality suggest these shifts are very unlikely to be a chance
finding. On balance, Boston’s charter high schools produce substantial
gains on the SAT as well as the MCAS.
D. AP-Taking and Scores
Advanced Placement coursework allows high schoolers to experience
the rigor of college-level courses and potentially earn college credit. Five
of the six charter schools in our sample offer AP classes, and one school
requires its students to pass AP exams in order to graduate. As shown in
table 6, charter school attendance increases the probability that a student
takes at least one AP exam by 30 percentage points. Consequently, almost
60% of charter students take at least one AP test, compared with 28% of
students in traditional public schools.18
Charter attendance increases the average number of AP tests that stu-
dents take by over a full exam, a result that can be seen in the second row
of table 6. Gains in AP scores are more modest. Charter school attendance
increases the likelihood of taking a test and earning a score of at least 2 by
16 percentage points, a statistically and quantitatively significant gain. But
a score of 3 or better is required to earn college credit, and many colleges
and universities require at least a 4. Charter attendance increases the prob-
ability of earning a score of 3 by 12 percentage points, a large effect relative
to the noncharter mean of 8%. At the same time, charter attendance gen-
erates no significant increase in the likelihood of earning a 4 or 5.19 Note
that by including zeros for nontakers in this analysis of score impact, we
avoid bias from possible composition effects due to the large effect of charter
attendance on the likelihood applicants take a test.
AP results by subject, reported in columns 3–10 of table 6, show a large
increase in the likelihood charter applicants take tests in science, calculus,
18 The AP-taking effect does not reflect a lack of AP options in traditional
public schools. BPS schools offer AP classes at the same or higher rates than
charter schools. See online appendix tables C3 and C4 for details.
19 The University of Massachussetts–Amherst and the University of Massachus-
setts–Boston require at least a 4 on the AP Calculus exam for college credit, a
threshold that most Boston students do not meet.
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and history, three of the most common categories of AP exams. Parallel-
ing charters’ large effect onMCASmath scores, the clearest AP score gains
emerge for calculus. Charter attendance boosts the probability of taking
the AP Calculus test by 22 percentage points and increases the likelihood
of earning a score of at least 2 by nearly 13 points. The corresponding im-
pact on the likelihoodof earning a 3 onAPCalculus is 11 percentage points;
relative to the noncharter mean of 1.9%, this implies that charter atten-
dance more than quintuples the chances a student earns a 3 in calculus.
There is also an effect on the 4 or higher threshold, with charter attendance
increasing the likelihood of scoring in the highest categories by a mar-
ginally significant 3.6 percentage points. This is more than three times the
probability of scoring 4 or higher for noncharter students. Charter atten-
dance also increases AP scores in science and US history, with more stu-
dents scoring above a 2 and above a 3 in both subjects. Charter schools have
little effect on AP English test-taking or scores.
V. College Enrollment and Choice
The charter schools in this study focus on college readiness. Nearly half
of the applicants in our sample enroll in college immediately in the fall af-
ter graduation, while 60% start college within 18 months of expected high
school graduation.While the estimated effect of charter attendance on col-
lege attendance is positive, it is not large enough to generate a statistically
significant gain. This can be seen in the first row of table 7, which reports
enrollment rates and charter effects for two subsamples. The first sample
includes cohorts for whomwe have college attendance data for the fall im-
mediately following their expected high school graduation ðthe “within
6 months” sampleÞ. The second, smaller, sample includes cohorts we can
follow for an additional year ðthe “within 18 months” sampleÞ. Columns 2
and 4 report enrollment effects on applicants who can be followed in these
two windows. The estimated enrollment effects of 0.028 and 0.075 are not
precise enough to rule out chance findings.
While the estimates of overall enrollment effects are inconclusive, the
results in table 7 show a clear shift from 2-year colleges to 4-year colleges.
Specifically, in the 6-month enrollment window, charter attendance de-
creases 2-year attendance by 11 points, while increasing 4-year attendance
by13points.Thedecline in2-year attendance is again11points in the longer
timewindow,while the estimated gain in 4-year attendance is an even larger
18 percentage points. Gains in 4-year attendance are large enough to gen-
erate highly significant estimates, with confidence intervals well away from
zero.
The gains in 4-year enrollment documented in table 7 are driven en-
tirely by increases in attendance at public 4-year schools, with no effect
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on private attendance. The last row of table 7 shows that most of this gain
is generated by enrollment at Massachusetts public colleges. In fact, the
Boston campus of the University of Massachusetts is the modal institution
for former charter students in our sample. The Adams Scholarship likely
contributes to this pattern, though college counseling may also play a role.
In a recent study, Cohodes and Goodman ð2014Þ argue that Adams
Scholarship awards tend to reduce the selectivity of colleges chosen by
many scholarship winners. We therefore estimated the effects of charter
attendance on college selectivity as measured by Barron’s rankings ðnot
shownÞ. College selectivity downgrading does not appear to be a conse-
quence of charter attendance, perhaps because most of Boston’s Adams
scholarship recipients come from lower-income backgrounds. The Cohodes
and Goodman findings are driven by higher-income students who might
otherwise have attended private schools.
In addition to college enrollment, we look briefly at college persistence,
asmeasured by the likelihood of enrolling for 3 or 5 semesters. The samples
available for such an analysis are necessarily smaller than those available to
study college enrollment. Persistence results within 18 months of high
Table 7
Lottery Estimates of Effects on College Enrollment
Within 6 Months Within 18 Months
Noncharter Mean Effect Noncharter Mean Effect
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
Any postsecondary enrollment .497 .028 .596 .075
ð.066Þ ð.081Þ
2-year .123 2.107** .186 2.108*
ð.046Þ ð.061Þ
4-year .374 .134** .410 .183**
ð.064Þ ð.073Þ
4-year public .143 .141*** .148 .145**
ð.053Þ ð.060Þ
4-year private .231 2.007 .262 .038
ð.069Þ ð.081Þ
4-year Massachusetts public .123 .121** .126 .115**
ð.049Þ ð.057Þ
N 3,205 2,599
NOTE.—This table reports two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of Boston charter school
attendance on college enrollment. Enrollment within 6 months ðcols. 1 and 2Þ is defined as enrollment by
the semester following a student’s projected high school graduation, while enrollment within 18 months
ðcols. 3 and 4Þ is defined as enrollment within two fall semesters after projected graduation. The within
6 months enrollment sample includes students projected to graduate in 2012 or earlier. The within
18 months sample includes students projected to graduate in 2011 or earlier. The note to table 3 details the
2SLS models used to construct these estimates. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
298 Angrist et al.
This content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 16, 2016 10:36:46 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
school graduation, reported in table 8, suggest that charter attendance in-
creases the fraction of students who attempt at least 3 academic semesters
at 4-year schools by about 12 points, a marginally significant effect. The
corresponding estimate in panel B, computed in a sample window that al-
lows an additional year to elapse before measurement of the outcome, is
smaller ð6 percentage pointsÞ but less precisely estimated. Estimated effects
on 5-plus semesters of enrollment are similarly imprecise.
Taken together, the estimates reported here show that charter high school
attendance generates gains through college preparation and institutional
choice as well as in short-run achievement. Figure 3 summarizes the rela-
tionship between short-run and long-run impacts. This figure plots MCAS
estimates against estimates for longer-run outcomes for each of the within-
risk-set experiments in our charter lottery data. Each risk set is represented
by a bubble, with bubble sizes inversely proportional to the standard error
of theMCAS estimate for that risk set. As can be seen in panel A, SAT score
gains track MCAS gains closely. Likewise, risk sets where score gains are
larger also appear to generate larger 4-year enrollment effects, though here
the relationship between impacts is looser than for the two test scores
ðshown in panel BÞ. These findings suggest that the short-run effects of
Boston’s charter high schools on MCAS scores are a reliable guide to their
longer-run effects.
VI. Additional Results
A. Effects in Subgroups
Estimates of effects within subgroups pinpoint the characteristics of
students who benefit most from charter attendance. This section briefly
summarizes a large set of subgroup results reported in online appendix B.
Results for most outcomes are similar for boys and girls. For example,
estimates of effects on SAT scores and 4-year college enrollment are large
and positive for both boys and girls, though these gender-specific effects
are not precisely estimated. In view of evidence that many educational in-
terventions do not work well for males, this finding seems noteworthy
ðsee, e.g., Anderson 2008; Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos 2009; Legewie
and DiPrete 2012; Deming et al. 2014Þ.
MCAS, SAT, and 4-year enrollment effects are larger for special needs
students than for other applicants. Similarly, students with baseline scores
below the sample median are more likely to gain from charter attendance
than are high-scorers.20 Effects on MCAS scores are somewhat larger for
20 Here the sample is split by whether the sum of baseline math and ELA scores
is below the median of this measure in the full MCAS ELA sample.
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FIG. 3.—Comparisons of lottery estimates of effects on earlier and later outcomes. This figure plots
within-risk-set lottery estimates of the effects of charter school attendance. Panel A plots effects on SAT
Reasoning ðverbal and mathÞ against effects on MCAS composite scores. Panel B plots effects on the
probability of enrollment in a 4-year college within 6 months of projected graduation against effects on
MCAS composite scores. The sample in panelA includes students projected to graduate between 2007 and
2013,while the sample in panelB includes students projected to graduate between2006 and 2012. Samples in
both panels are further restricted to studentswith available data for both outcomes.Circles indicate risk sets
in which students applied to one school, while squares indicate risk sets in which students applied to two.
Marker sizes are proportional to the inverse of the standard errors of theMCAS estimates. Estimates for a
given risk set use the instrument ðimmediate or ever offerÞ with the larger first-stage t-statistic. The
sample excludes risk sets with first-stage t-statistics less than 1. Lines show weighted least squares re-
gressions with weights inversely proportional to standard errors. The slopes are 87.9 ðSE 5 16.9Þ for the
SAT plot and 0.133 ðSE 5 0.053Þ for the 4-year enrollment plot.
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below-median students, and the effect on composite SAT scores is also
larger for the lower-scoring group. The effect of charter attendance on
4-year college enrollment is driven entirely by students whose scores are
belowmedian at baseline, andmuch of the 4-year effect on this group comes
from an increase in the overall rate of college enrollment rather than a shift
from 2-year to 4-year institutions.
The subgroup analysis shows a less consistent pattern by poverty status
ðas proxied by qualification for a subsidized lunchÞ, with the disadvan-
taged group gaining more in college enrollment and AP-taking but less on
the SAT. This finding is notable given recent evidence that apparently
college-ready poor students often choose not to attend 4-year institutions
ðBowen, Chingos, andMcPherson 2009; Hoxby andAvery 2012Þ. Overall,
Boston’s charter high schools boost keyoutcomes formost subgroups,with
large effects on at-risk groups, including boys, special education students,
and those who enter high school with low achievement.21
B. The Peer Channel
Charter schools are sometimes said to generate gains by the selective re-
tention of higher-performing students ðsee, e.g., Skinner 2009Þ. In this
view, charter effectiveness is at least partly attributed to a tendency to eject
trouble-makers and stragglers, leaving a student population that is easier
to teach. Importantly, the causal interpretation of our lottery-based esti-
mation strategy is unaffected by selective retention because we follow all
winners and losers, regardless of whether they stay in the charter school.
Moreover, the charter enrollment variable is “switched on” even for stu-
dents who spend only a single day enrolled in a charter school. Thus, out-
comes for poor-performing charter students who leave the school still
count on the charter side of our IV estimation strategy.
At the same time, selective retention, if substantial, may lead to a favor-
able population mix that generates positive peer effects on students who
remain enrolled in charters. In otherwords, charter schoolsmay dowell for
most of their students in part because a few bad apples who would other-
wise be disruptive to all are encouraged to leave. While not invalidating
the evidence of gains reported here, this peer channel has different policy
implications than other explanations of charter effectiveness, such as dif-
ferences in teacher quality or training.
21 In addition to looking at heterogeneity in effects across subgroups of stu-
dents, we also asked whether the results are driven by any one charter school.
Online appendix table B3 reports estimates for key outcomes in samples that drop
data for one school at a time. The results are similar across samples, suggesting that
the overall results are not due to the performance of any one school.
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We explore the peer channel by looking directly at school switching and
how this affects peer composition. School switching is defined as being ob-
served in two or more schools after a lottery application. As shown in
panel B, column 1, of table 9, Boston’s charter lottery applicants are highly
mobile: more than 40% of the sample changes schools by this measure.
Column 2, which reports 2SLS estimates of effects on school switching,
shows that charter enrollment raises the likelihood of a switch by about
2 percentage points, though this change is not significantly different from
zero. The switching estimate increases to roughly 9 percentage points, again
not significant, when switching is defined to omit natural transitional
grades such as from fifth to sixth ðsome charters have unusual grade struc-
tures, a fact that might alter transition ratesÞ.
Might this evidence of differential switching account for the charter
school gains reported here? Panel A assesses the explanatory power of the
peer channel by showing the effects of charter enrollment on peer quality
throughout high school. Here, peer quality is defined as the average base-
line test score of the studentswithwhom a lottery applicant attends school.
Not surprisingly, given the positive selection of charter applicants, char-
ter enrollment is associated with increases in peer achievement in the first
post-lottery year: the effect here is roughly 0.19j in each subject. This com-
positioneffectwouldbe even larger if not for the fact, documented in the last
row of panel B, that charter enrollment reduces exam school enrollment. In
otherwords, the counterfactual for some charter students is an exam school,
which also enrolls positively selected peers.
Panel A also shows, however, that the positive effect of charter atten-
dance on peer quality falls through high school: peer composition effects
shrink as students progress through school and are not significantly dif-
ferent from zero after the second year. The pattern of peer composition
effects is driven, in part, by increasing peer quality in the schools attended
by those who lose charter lotteries. This is documented in figure 4, which
plots the profile of mean peer quality for charter lottery compliers sepa-
rately by treatment status. Mean peer quality for compliers is estimated
using methods similar to those used to construct the densities in figures 1
and 2.22 Figure 4 documents a large initial gap in favor of lottery winners.
This gap closes with time, as peer quality rises more sharply for compliers
who lose the lottery. This pattern is likely driven by high dropout rates
at traditional public schools among students with the lowest baseline
scores. These results suggest that positive charter effects cannot be attri-
buted to low-quality peers leaving charter schools. If anything, selective
22 Specifically, we estimate versions of eqs. ð3Þ and ð4Þ that put the level of peer
composition on the left-hand side, without kernel weighting.
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FIG. 4.—Peer quality for charter lottery compliers. This figure plots mean peer
quality in the first, second, third, and fourth years after the lottery for treated and
untreated charter lottery compliers. The sample includes lottery applicants who
are projected to graduate between 2006 and 2013. Peer quality is measured as the
average baseline score for other students in the same school and year.
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exit of low achievers is more pronounced at Boston’s traditional public
schools.23
VI. Conclusion
This paper uses randomized admission lotteries to ask whether Boston’s
charter high schools affect outcomes beyond the standardized tests that
are used for statutory accountability reviews and charter renewal. Charter
schools may be particularly likely to “teach to the test,” since they are at
risk of closure if their students score poorly. We therefore estimate charter
effects on high school graduation, college attendance, and college choice,
outcomes that are more clearly linked to long-term economic well-being
than state assessments.We also look at performance on SAT andAdvanced
Placement subject exams, assessments not directly involved with account-
ability that might also be connected with postsecondary gains. Our esti-
mates suggest that Boston’s charters improve educational outcomes in many
domains.24
Charter attendance has no clear effect on high school graduation, though
charter students take slightly longer to complete their degrees. Charter
attendance also has no statistically significant effect on the overall likeli-
hood of college enrollment, but it shifts students away from 2-year insti-
tutions and toward 4-year colleges. The shift toward 4-year colleges is
consistent with the substantial gains in college readiness seen for charter
students. In particular, charter attendance more than doubles the likeli-
hood of sitting for an Advanced Placement exam, with especially large ef-
fects on the likelihood of taking and passing AP Calculus. This finding is
noteworthy since very few poor nonwhite students in Boston ðor other
urban areasÞ take and pass AP Calculus.
Charters significantly increase SAT scores, with charter students scor-
ing a third of a standard deviation higher than students in Boston’s tradi-
tional public schools. Charter attendance also increases the probability that
students pass the score thresholds for high-stakes exams required for high
school graduation and boosts the likelihood that students qualify for an
exam-based public college scholarship. Boston’s charter high schools seem
23 We also explored the importance of the peer channel by estimating 2SLS
models where the endogenous variable is peer quality. The results of this analysis
are reported in online appendix table B5. These models imply that, in order for
peers to account for the estimated effect of charters, a 1j increase in initial peer
quality must improve a student’s test score by between 1.8j and 2j. This peer mul-
tiplier is implausibly large relative to peer effects estimated elsewhere, including
Hoxby ð2000Þ ð0.3j–0.5jÞ, Hanushek et al. ð2003Þ ð0.15j–0.24jÞ, and other studies
summarized in Sacerdote ð2011Þ’s recent survey.
24 Also weighing against the “teaching to the test” hypothesis, Cohodes ð2015Þ
reports no difference in effects on frequently and infrequently tested MCAS item
areas for a sample of Boston middle school charters.
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to be highly effective for subgroups that are often difficult to serve, includ-
ing boys, special education students, and students with low achievement at
high school entry.
In view of often-voiced concerns about the effect of charter schools on
student attrition, we looked briefly at charter attendance effects on school
switching and peer composition. Charter students have somewhat higher
baseline test scores than other Boston students. At the same time, we see
that charter attendance does not produce increasingly favorable selection
of peers. In fact, charter peers become more like peers at traditional pub-
lic schools as students progress through high school because attrition for
weak students is even more pronounced in the traditional public sector. It
therefore seems unlikely that changes in peer composition are the primary
driver of our findings.
A final important result is the correlation between gains on state-
mandated assessments and gains elsewhere. While MCAS scores may not
be of intrinsic interest, schools that tend to boost these also tend to increase
SAT scores and 4-year college enrollment. In other words, causal effects on
MCAS scores appear to predict effects that may be more closely tied to
human capital and earnings.
As a caveat, it is worth noting that our results apply to charter lottery
applicants, a group that may differ from nonapplicants. In addition, our
estimates may not reflect the effects of expanding the number of seats in
Boston’s charter sector, which depend on the supply of teachers and other
inputs, as well as potential effects of changes in peer mix for students who
remain in traditional public schools. The estimates reported here show
gains for recent cohorts of charter applicants. As these cohorts continue
to progress through college and enter the labor market, we plan to use our
lottery-based research design to determine whether the effects reported
here extend to college completion, employment, and earnings.
Appendix A
Data Appendix
Lists of charter applicants and lottery winners are constructed from
records provided by individual charter schools. Information on schools
attended and student demographics come from the Student Information
Management System ðSIMSÞ, a centralized database that covers all public
school students in Massachusetts. Test scores are from the Massachusetts
Comprehensive Assessment System ðMCASÞ. Advanced Placement ðAPÞ
and Scholastic Aptitude Test ðSATÞ scores are provided by the College
Board. College attendance information comes from the National Student
Clearinghouse ðNSCÞ. This appendix describes each data source anddetails
the procedures used to clean and match them.
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Lottery Data
Data Description and Sample Restrictions
Our sample of applicants is obtained from records of lotteries held at six
Massachusetts charter schools between 2002 and 2009. The participating
schools and lottery years are listed in table A1. A total of 26 school-specific
entry cohorts are included in the analysis. Lotteries for three participating
schools, Match High, Codman Academy, and City on a Hill, were con-
ducted for entry to ninth grade; two schools, Boston Preparatory andAcad-
emy of the Pacific Rim, held lotteries for sixth-grade entry. Records for
Boston Collegiate are from fifth-grade entry lotteries.
The raw lottery records typically include applicant names, dates of birth,
contact information, and other information used to define lottery groups,
such as sibling status. The first five rows in table A1 show the sample re-
strictions we impose on the raw lottery records. We exclude duplicate ap-
plicants and applicants listed as applying to the wrong entry grade.We also
drop late applicants, out-of-area applicants, and sibling applicants, as these
groups are typically not included in the standard lottery process. Impos-
ing these restrictions reduces the number of lottery records from 9,256 to
8,851.
Lottery Offers
In addition to the data described above, the lottery records also include
information regarding offered seats. We used this information to recon-
struct indicator variables for whether lottery participants received ran-
domized offers. We make use of two sources of variation in charter offers,
which differ in timing. The immediate offer instrument captures offers
made on the day of the charter school lottery. Thewaitlist offer instrument
captures offers made later, as a consequence of movement down a ran-
domly sequenced waiting list. The pattern of instrument availability across
schools and applicant cohorts is documented in panel B of appendix
table A1. In some years, all applicants eventually received offers, in which
case only the immediate offer instrument contributes to the analysis; these
cases are listed as “Exhausted” for the waitlist offer instrument. As docu-
mented in table 2, immediate and waitlist offer rates were 31% and 35%,
respectively, in our MCAS analysis sample, and these rates were similar in
the samples for other outcomes.
SIMS Data
Data Description
Our study uses SIMS data from the 2001–2 school year through the
2012–13 school year. The SIMS records information on demographics and
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schools attended for all students in Massachusetts public schools. An ob-
servation in the SIMS refers to a student in a school in a year, though there
are some student-school-year duplicates for students that switch grades or
programs within a school and year. The SIMS includes a unique student
identifier known as the SASID, which is used tomatch students from other
data sources as described below.
Coding of Demographics and Attendance
The SIMS variables used in our analysis include grade, year, name, town
of residence, date of birth, gender, race, special education and limited
English proficiency status, free or reduced-price lunch receipt, and school at-
tended. We constructed a wide-format data set that captures demographic
and attendance information for every student in each year in which he or
she is present in a Massachusetts public school. This file uses information
from the longest-attended school in the first calendar year spent in each
grade. Attendance ties were broken at random; this affects only 0.007% of
records. Students classified as special education, limited English profi-
ciency, or eligible for a free or reduced-price lunch in any record within a
school-year-grade retain that designation for the entire school-year-grade.
The SIMS also includes exit codes for the final time a student is observed in
the database. These codes are used to determine high school graduates and
transfers.
Wemeasure charter school attendance in ninth or tenth grade. A student
is coded as attending a charter in his or her ninth-grade or tenth-grade year
when there is any SIMS record reporting charter attendance in that year.
Students who attend more than one charter school within a year are as-
signed to the charter they attended longest.
MCAS Data
We use MCAS data from the 2001–2 school year through the 2012–13
school year. Each observation in the MCAS database corresponds to a
student’s test results in a particular grade and year. The MCAS outcomes
of interest are math and English language arts ðELAÞ tests in grade 10. We
also use baseline tests taken prior to charter application, which are from
fourth grade or eighth grade depending on a student’s application grade.
The raw test score variables are standardized to have mean zero and stan-
dard deviation one within a subject-grade-year in Massachusetts. We also
make use of scaled scores, which are used to determine whether students
meetMCAS thresholds, which areNeeds Improvement, Proficient, andAd-
vanced. Unless otherwise noted, we only use the first test taken in a par-
ticular subject and grade.
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AP and SAT Data
We use AP and SAT data files provided to the Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Elementary and Secondary Education ðDESEÞ by the College
Board. The AP and SAT files include scores on all AP exams and SAT tests
for graduation cohorts 2007 and 2013; for studentswho took the SATmore
than once, the file includes only the score for themost recent exam. TheAP
and SATfiles also include SASID identifiers, which are used tomerge these
outcomes with the SIMS database.
NSC Data
Data on college outcomes comes from the National Student Clearing-
house ðNSCÞ database, which captures enrollment for 94% of under-
graduates in Massachusetts. We combine information from five separate
searches of the NSC database:
• A 2010 search for all students in the SIMS database between 2002–9
with projected graduation years earlier than 2014, assuming normal
academic progress from the last observed grade and year ðnot re-
stricted to students who graduated high schoolÞ
• A 2011 search of students who graduated from Massachusetts public
high schools in the class of 2010
• A 2012 search of all students who graduated from Massachusetts
public high schools in the classes of 2003–10
• A 2013 search of students who graduated from Massachusetts public
high schools in the classes of 2003–12
• A 2013 search of all students in the charter applicant sample with the
projected graduation between 2006–13
All students in our charter applicant sample were included in the 2010
NSC search, and Massachusetts high school graduates were included in
multiple searches. College types are coded using the first attended college
after the last date a student is observed in the SIMS. NSC searches were
conducted using criteria like name and date of birth; the NSC files also
include SASIDs, which are used to merge the college outcomes with the
SIMS database.
Matching Data Sets
TheMCAS,AP, SAT, andNSCdata files aremerged to themaster SIMS
data file using the unique SASID identifier. The lottery records do not
include SASIDs; these records arematchedmanually to the SIMS by name,
application year, and application grade. In some cases, this procedure did
not produce a unique match. We accepted some matches based on fewer
310 Angrist et al.
This content downloaded from 018.051.001.088 on August 16, 2016 10:36:46 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
criteriawhere the information on grade, year and townof residence seemed
to make sense.
Our matching procedure successfully located most applicants in the
SIMS database. The sixth row of panel A of table A1 reports the number
of applicant records matched to the SIMS in each applicant cohort. The
overall match rate across all cohorts was 94% ð8,342/8,851Þ.
Once matched to the SIMS, each student is associated with a unique
SASID; at this point, we can therefore determine which students applied
to multiple schools in our lottery sample. Following the match, we re-
shape the lottery data set to contain a single record for each student. If
students applied in more than 1 year, we keep only records associated with
the earliest year of application. Our lottery analysis also excludes students
who did not attend a Boston Public Schools ðBPSÞ school at baseline, as
students applying from private schools have lower follow-up rates. This
restriction eliminates 22% of charter applicants. Of the remaining 4,711
charter applicants, 3,685 ð78%Þ contribute a score to our MCAS ELA
analysis.
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Table A2
Matching School Lottery Data to SIMS
Number of
Applicants
Sample
Mean
Immediate
Offer
Waitlist
Offer
Projected Senior Year ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
2006 570 .912 2.016 .034
ð.023Þ ð.027Þ
2007 437 .959 2.006 2.007
ð.025Þ ð.028Þ
2008 905 .950 .000 2.002
ð.007Þ ð.019Þ
2009 864 .944 2.001 .005
ð.005Þ ð.018Þ
2010 1,101 .959 2.004 .024**
ð.003Þ ð.012Þ
2011 1,482 .941 2.007*** .043***
ð.003Þ ð.014Þ
2012 1,642 .942 2.008*** .056***
ð.002Þ ð.012Þ
2013 1,850 .942 2.003** .026**
ð.001Þ ð.011Þ
All cohorts 8,851 .944 2.002 .028***
ð.006Þ ð.006Þ
NOTE.—This table summarizes the match from the lottery records to the Student Information Man-
agement System ðSIMSÞ administrative data. The sample excludes disqualified applicants, late applicants,
out-of-area applicants, and siblings. Columns 3 and 4 report coefficients from regressions of an indicator
for a successful SIMS match on immediate and waitlist offer dummies. The immediate offer dummy is
equal to one when a student is offered a seat in any charter school immediately following the lottery, while
the waitlist offer dummy is equal to one for students offered seats later. All regressions include risk set
dummies. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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